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I

has been, and
still is, a powerful engine of growth for the world economy. Most countries
have greatly benefited from trade liberalization, but the uneven distribution of
the gains from trade between and within countries explains the past and current resistance to trade liberalization. Trade liberalization can be accomplished through several instruments. Which paths will be preferred depends on the instruments considered as well as the objectives and constraints of the governments. Thus, even if governments intend to deviate from free trade, they are likely to be concerned about the
cost of supplying protection to various groups. For example, the Canadian dairy industry uses a supply management policy to achieve what is considered a “fair” price
for dairy producers. A “fair” price is at the heart of many countries’ agricultural policy. In such instances, governments are interested in comparing the welfare levels of
policies generating the same domestic price. Such comparisons are often referred to
as comparisons of price-equivalent policy instruments.1
Kaempfer, McClure, and Willett (1989) compared price-equivalent tariffs and
quotas in the setting of a single domestic firm competing with a large number of
small traders. In their setting, specific and ad valorem tariffs are equivalent, but the
tariffs and quotas cannot be unambiguously ranked, as the welfare dominance of one
versus the other critically depends on the positioning of the marginal cost curve and
the range of domestic prices considered. The integrity of a high or “fair” domestic
price policy can be jeopardized by legal or illegal imports. The European Union used
variable import levies in the past to lock its domestic prices, while Canada relied on
tight import quotas and production licenses to achieve the same goal for its supply*
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Bhagwati (1965, 1969) was the first to demonstrate the non-equivalence between “importequivalent” tariffs and quotas when domestic production is monopolized. He showed that an ad
valorem tariff is better than a quota in this instance. Larue and Lapan (2002) showed that this result is
not robust when smuggling is allowed.
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managed industries. Furthermore, the seasonal safeguard measures integrated in most
trade agreements are designed to protect domestic prices. Accordingly, we believe
that it is possibly more relevant to use the domestic price to anchor tariffs-quota comparisons than to use the volume of imports.
Governments may also be preoccupied with revenue considerations, especially
when the income tax base is small and consumption taxes are difficult to implement.
In such instances, trade policies can be used to finance a public good that cannot be
financed through more efficient means (Choi and Lapan 1991). Alternatively, the
policy revenue could be the prize for sale in an all-pay auction involving lobby
groups.2 Regardless of the motivation behind a revenue objective, governments are
likely to be concerned about the efficiency with which they can achieve revenue targets. Consequently, it is useful to investigate the revenue-generating capacity of various instruments and to assess their relative efficiency at different levels of revenue.
As is well known, the ability to raise revenues from trade taxes depends on market
structure (e.g., Larue and Gervais 2002) and the ability of a government to prevent
smuggling (e.g., Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1973). During the 1980s it was well known
that Canadian supermarkets located close to the Canada-U.S. border were selling far
fewer dairy and poultry products than supermarkets located farther away. While
annoying, this smuggling problem was nothing compared to the cigarette smuggling
problem of the 1990s. In 1994, smuggling was so rampant that it was estimated that
two out of three cigarettes purchased in Quebec were contraband (Globe and Mail,
July 28, 1997). The Canadian government is currently suing several tobacco companies to recuperate Can$1.5 billion in lost taxes.
The current paper compares price-equivalent and revenue-equivalent tariffs and
quotas when domestic production is monopolized, an assumption used to facilitate the
introduction of imperfect competition in the domestic market. We begin by re-visiting
the “small-country” model of Kaempfer, McClure, and Willett (1989). The simpler
“small country” model sets up the stage for a more complicated case with endogenous
terms of trade and smuggling. The paper ends with a summary of the main results and
their policy implications.
The Small-Country Model Without Smuggling

T

on the same assumptions as those
found in Kaempfer, McClure, and Willett (1989). There is a single domestic
firm with a quadratic cost function, c(Q), where Q is the output of the firm. Defining
2

HE MODEL USED IN THIS SECTION IS BASED

As shown in Cunha and Santos (1996) and Larue and Gervais (2002), the issue of who gets the import license(s) among domestic producing firms, domestic traders, and foreign traders has important
welfare consequences when the domestic market is imperfectly competitive.
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L as the volume of imports, the firm is confronted to a linear domestic demand curve:
p d ( D) = θ(Q + L); θ′ > 0 = θ′′ . The world price is unaffected by the behavior of the
monopolist and is simply a constant, ω. Finally, imports are purchased by a large
number of small traders that can be considered as a competitive fringe. Accordingly,
the monopolist acts as a dominant firm when there are imports. In this setting, ad
valorem and specific tariffs are equivalent. We rely on the latter when analyzing tariff
protection. The behavior of the domestic firm is simple. Under a quota R, the firm
exploits a residual demand curve D R ( p, R ) ≡ D ( p ) − R . Output is rising with the
domestic price. As R becomes larger and Q smaller, there will be a critical quota R =
Rmax at which the profit of the domestic firm from exploiting the residual demand is
just equal to the profit of the domestic firm under free trade. This occurs at a domestic
price in excess of the world price and hence at a lower level of output. Consequently,
there are no price-equivalent quotas for low tariffs that keep the domestic price close
to the world price. This is the essence of Proposition 1 found in Kaempfer, McClure,
and Willett (1989). When the quota is zero, the monopolist is unconstrained and the
domestic price achieves its highest level. The level of output under a prohibitive
quota may be inferior or superior to that under free trade depending on the marginal
cost curve of the monopolist.
The monopolist acts as a price-taking firm when tariffs are sufficiently low to allow imports in the domestic market. Output is rising with the specific tariff t (and the
domestic price) when 0 ≤ t < t0. Output (Q) and imports (L) are jointly determined by
the following two restrictions: c′(Q) = ω + t = θ(Q + L), where c′(Q) is the marginal
cost of the monopolist. When the tariff is high enough to eliminate imports (i.e., t ≥
t0), the domestic price exceeds the marginal cost, θ(Q) = ω + t > c′(Q), and output decreases with the tariff. Tariffs can be so high as to prompt the monopolist to choose a
price below the tariff-augmented world price. We refer to the minimum tariff at
which this occurs as t2.3 If t ∈ (t2, ∞), the tariff is said to provide redundant protection.
Thus, an increase in the tariff can induce an increase, a decrease, or no change in
output, depending on which domain the tariff is in.
When the domestic price anchors tariffs-quota comparisons, the best instrument is
the one that supplies the domestic market at the cheapest cost because the sum of domestic output and imports must be the same under both instruments. In our partial
equilibrium setting, welfare is simply the sum of consumer surplus, the firm’s profit,
and policy revenue. Consequently, the welfare criterion is simply

W = ∫ p( D)dD − c(Q) − ωL .
Because D ≡ Q + L must be the same under the two instruments if they are to be priceequivalent, it follows that the tariff t (quota R) will be preferred to the quota (tariff) if

3

The reason for not calling this tariff t1 will become clear once smuggling is taken into account.
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SCt ≡ ωL(t ) + c ( Q(t ) ) < (>) ωR + c ( Q( R) ) ≡ SCR ,

(1)

where SCi stands for the sourcing costs under instrument i. If c′(0) < ω , efficient
sourcing calls for using only domestic products as long as c′(Q) < ω and for using
both sources to maintain c′(Q) = ω when Q < D. If the marginal cost of the domestic
firm rises quickly, imports become cheaper at the margin at low demand levels. As
the domestic price decreases, efficient sourcing calls for using more imports and less
domestic products. When this occurs, the quota tends to dominate because it uses
more imports to achieve a given domestic price than the tariff. Alternatively, when
the domestic firm is relatively efficient, in the sense that it could secure a large share
of the domestic market under free trade, the quota is relatively inefficient because it
forces too many expensive imports to achieve a given domestic price. This is the essence of Proposition 2 of Kaempfer, McClure, and Willett (1989).4 Dominance of an
instrument need not be observed for all admissible domestic prices. Figure 1 illustrates the sourcing costs of quota and tariff regimes for two cases. In the first one, the
domestic firm has a market share of 0.25 under free trade and domestic production is
relatively inefficient. In this case, quotas (i.e., the bold dashed line) have lower
sourcing costs than price-equivalent tariffs (i.e., the bold continuous line), except at
low domestic prices. When the domestic firm is efficient enough to capture a 0.75
market share under free trade, tariffs are unambiguously better than quotas, as shown
by the thinner lines. The figure illustrates the truncation of admissible prices due to
the fact that the quota regime cannot be supported by low domestic prices.
The Large Country Case with Smuggling

The Behavior of the Domestic Firm

A

s in the previous section, we assume that there is a single domestic firm with a
technology characterized by a linearly increasing marginal cost. The domestic
firm competes with foreign imports that can be legally obtained or smuggled. The
domestic price is now a linear function of the sum of legal imports L, illegal imports
S, and domestic production Q: Pd = θ(L + S + Q), θ′ ≡ ∂θ/∂D < 0, θ″ ≡ 0. The world
price is now linearly increasing in the sum of legal and illegal imports:

ω( I ) > 0,
4

ω ' ≡ ∂ω / ∂I > 0, ω " ≡ 0;

I ≡ L+S .

(2)

Kaempfer, McClure, and Willett (1989) suggest that the tariff dominates the quota if the domestic
firm has a marginal cost that allows it to supply at least half of the domestic market under free trade.
Larue, Gervais, and Pouliot (2004) show that the quota can dominate when the domestic firm’s market
share under free trade is exactly one half. Hence, the allusion to the 0.5 market share threshold can be
misleading.
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Figure 1. Sourcing Costs for Price-Equivalent Tariffs (dashed lines) and Quotas (continuous
lines) Under the Small Country Assumption, No Smuggling, and Two Cost Functions

There are a large number of smugglers who behave competitively. We assume that
there is an “industry-wide” cost externality, in the sense that average cost at the industry level is increasing, but the average cost at the individual level is constant. This
congestion effect ensures that the price of illegal imports is an increasing function of
the total volume smuggled (S ≡ Σsi). A rationale for this is that it becomes more difficult for smugglers to avoid detection by enforcement authorities when the number of
smugglers and the total quantity smuggled increase. If the average cost of a smuggler
is constant with respect to its own volume (si) and smugglers are identical, a smuggler’s profit could be written as
πis ( (θ − ω) − η( S ) ) si ,

(3)

where η(S) is the marginal and average private cost of smuggling. It is assumed that
η(0) > 0, η′ > 0, and η″ = 0. This ensures that smuggling is not feasible at the slightest
departure from free trade. The monopolist maximizes profits, πM = θ(Q + I )Q − c(Q) ,
but its ability to set high prices is hindered by import competition. Generally, its
output choice satisfies
∂πM
= θ + θ ' Q(1 + I Q ) − c ' = 0 ,
∂Q

(4)

6

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF STANLEY R. JOHNSON

where the term IQ depends on the arbitrage conditions associated with the supply of
legal and illegal imports.
We begin by analyzing tariff equilibria near free trade to expose, from the start,
differences between the ad valorem and specific tariffs once the small-country–nosmuggling assumptions are relaxed. In the range of domestic prices considered,
smuggling is not profitable but legal imports are. The arbitrage conditions when there
are legal imports under an ad valorem tariff and a specific tariff are
θ( I + Q) ≤ (1 + τ)ω( I )

(5)

θ( I + Q) ≤ t + ω( I ) .

(6)

By forcing these conditions to hold with equality and differentiating them with respect to I and Q, the monopolist’s first-order conditions when there is legal trade under both tariffs are
⎛ ω '(1 + τ) ⎞
∂πM
= θ + θ 'Q ⎜
⎟−c' = 0
∂Q
⎝ ω '(1 + τ) − θ ' ⎠

(7)

∂πM
⎛ ω' ⎞
= θ + θ 'Q ⎜
⎟ −c' = 0.
∂Q
⎝ ω '− θ ' ⎠

(8)

For tariff rates τ ∈ [0, τ0 ) and tariff levels t ∈ [0, t0 ) , smuggling is not observed. Hence
the upper bounds are set such that smuggling can no longer be deterred:

τ0 =

η(0)
,
ω( L0 )

t0 = η(0) .

Increases in the tariffs in these domains trigger increases in output and decreases in
legal imports. Through differentiation of the first-order condition and the arbitrage
constraint, it is easy to find that an increase in the specific tariff in this domain increases domestic output at the expense of legal imports:
θ'
>0,
ω '(2θ '− c ") + θ ' c "

(9)

θ′(θ′ − c′′) + ω′(−2θ′ + c′′)
< 0.
(ω′ − θ′) ( ω′(2θ '− c ") + θ′c′′ )

(10)

dQ / dt |t <t0 =

dL / dt t <t 0 =
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The impact of an increase in the ad valorem tariff on domestic production when
τ ∈ [0, τ0 ) is
dQ / d τ τ<τ =
0

θ′ ( −ωθ′ + ω′ ( ω(1 + τ) + θ′Q ) )

( ω′(1 + τ) − θ′)( (1 + τ)ω′(2θ′ − c′′) + θ′c′′)

>0

(11)

When there is sufficient protection to make smuggling feasible, the arbitrage conditions for the ad valorem and specific tariffs do not change as long as legal imports are
not totally displaced. Hence for τ0 ≤ τ < τ1 and t0 ≤ t < t1 , there is coexistence of legal
and illegal imports. The tariffs t0 and τ0 are the minimum tariffs supporting smuggling, while t1 and τ1 are the maximum tariffs supporting legal imports. For the specific tariff, the monopolist remains constrained by the tariff [as depicted by equation
(7)] and this, with two arbitrage conditions, θ(Q + L + S) = ω(L + S) + t = ω(L + S) +
η(S), jointly determine how the quantities produced and legally and illegally imported
evolve. Because the behavior of the monopolist is still driven by the tariff, we have
dQ / dt t ≤t <t = dQ / dt t <t .
0

1

0

It can be shown that the domestic price is increasing with the tariff level in this domain. For the ad valorem tariff, we find much more complex expressions that reveal
similar qualitative results: dQ / dτ > 0 > d(Q + L + S ) / dτ.
As tariff protection is enhanced, there is a point from which legal imports could
be totally displaced by illegal ones. Given our linearity assumptions, the condition for
this to happen under an ad valorem tariff is
τ>

η(0) η′
> .
ω(0) ω′

Assuming this holds, tariffs cease to generate revenues when t ≥ t1 , τ ≥ τ1 . There are
also tariffs t2 > t1 and τ2 > τ1 , which can be defined as the minimum non-redundant
tariffs, as further increases in the tariff levels/rates would have no impact on the
equilibrium. Within these tariff domains, domestic output adjusts to keep legal imports out of the domestic market, such that ω( S ) + η( S ) = {ω( S )(1 + τ), ω( S ) + t} . Peculiarly, the relationships between the volume smuggled and the tariff rate and the
relationship between the volume smuggled and the tariff level can be orthogonal. Under
the specific tariff, we have a positive relationship, dS / dt t ≤t <t = 1/ η ' > 0 , but oddly
1
2
enough, a negative relationship emerges under an ad valorem tariff:
dS / d τ τ ≤τ<τ = ω /(n '− τω ') < 0 .
1

2

(12)
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The monopolist’s output is evidently impacted by this. Under the specific tariff, the
monopolist reduces its output in response to a tariff hike:5
dQ / dt t ≤t <t =
1

2

−θ′ + ω′ + η '
<0.
η ' θ′

(13)

Domestic production and smuggling move in opposite directions in response to a tariff increase, but it can be shown that the total volume marketed decreases with the
tariff:
(dQ + dS ) / dt t ≤t <t =
1

2

ω′ + η '
< 0.
η ' θ′

Under the ad valorem tariff, domestic output is adjusted as follows:
dQ / dt τ ≤τ<τ =
1

2

ω(−θ '+ ω '+ η ') >
0.
θ '(−τω '+ η ') <

(14)

LEMMA 1: For τ1 ≤ τ < τ2 , the domestic price falls with the tariff rate, provided that
the smuggling technology be such that τω′ > η′.
PROOF: It suffices to show that total volume marketed increases with the tariff rate:

(dQ + dS ) / d τ τ ≤τ<τ =
1

2

ω(ω '+ η ')
>0
θ '(−τω '+ η ')

if τω ' > η ' . QED

Hence, we can observe a Metzler-like effect (the domestic price decreases with the
tariff rate!) without a backward-sloping marginal cost curve.
As mentioned above, any tariff increase when t ≥ t2 or τ ≥ τ2 has no effect on the
monopolist behavior. It follows that tariffs in excess of t2 or τ2 provide redundant
protection. Still, the monopolist must contend with the smugglers, and this is reflected in the residual demand it is facing as shown through its first-order condition:
⎛ ω '+ η ' ⎞
θ + θ 'Q ⎜
⎟−c' = 0 .
⎝ ω '+ η '− θ ' ⎠
5

(15)

Noting that the equilibrium in this tariff domain is at a kink in the residual demand of the monopolist,
the above result is obtained by differentiating the following arbitrage condition with respect to t, θ(Q +
S) = ω(S) + t, and using the fact that ∂S/∂t = 1/η′. The same logic is used for the ad valorem tariff.
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It is evident that the equilibrium at t ≥ t2 and τ ≥ τ2 that allows no legal imports is
identical to one triggered by a prohibitive quota.
Having analyzed the behavior of the monopolist under the specific and ad
valorem tariff regimes, we can now shift our attention to quotas. Under a quota of
size R > R0 large enough to deter smuggling, the behavioral rule of the monopolist
reflects the fact that the residual demand is more inelastic under a quota than under
both tariffs, as indicated by the first-order condition below:6
∂πM
= θ + θ 'Q − c ' = 0 .
∂Q

(16)

This allows the domestic firm to exploit its residual demand curve at levels of import
in excess of the free trade/zero tariff level of imports, which is the maximum level of
imports under the tariffs. The maximum quota, Rmax, is determined by the equalization of the monopolist’s profit when it is exploiting its residual demand curve and its
profit under free trade.
LEMMA 2: The minimum price under the quota regime exceeds the free trade price.
PROOF: If free trade is achieved through specific tariff reductions, then Rmax must
satisfy θ( QRmax + Rmax) QRmax – c( QRmax ) = θ(Qt + Lt) Qt – c(Qt)|t=0. When t ∈ (0,t] and R ∈
(Rmax,R0], the behavioral rules depicted by (16) and (18) imply that for profitequivalent tariffs and quotas, Q(t ) > Q( R) and L(t ) < R . These rules also imply that
increases in imports are associated with output contractions and price reductions.
More specifically, it is easy to show that

∂ ( Qt ( Lt ) + Lt ) ω '(θ '− c ") − θ '(−2ω '+ 2θ '− c ")
=
∂Lt
ω '(2θ '− c ") − θ '(θ '− c ")
and that
∂ ( Q( R) + R ) θ′ − c′′
.
=
∂R
2θ′ − c′′

6

This can be seen by comparing (16) with (7) and (8). It is then obvious that the marginal revenues under
all three instruments are different. It can also be shown that
d θ / dR =

θ '2 − θ ' c "
<0.
2θ '− c "
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Given our assumptions, the domestic price decreases linearly with imports in both
cases. Free trade profits π ft = pQ − c(Q ) can be achieved with different combinations
of prices and output levels, including the price-quantity combinations associated with
a zero tariff and the maximum quota:
−( p − c′) d 2 p
dp
=
; 2
dQ π=π ft
Q
dQ

=
π=π ft

2( p − c′) c′′
+ .
Q2
Q

At the free trade equilibrium,
⎛ ω′ ⎞
p − c′ = −θ′Q ⎜
⎟ > 0,
⎝ ω′ − θ′ ⎠
and it is easy to see that the domestic firm is on the negatively sloped and convex
portion of the free trade iso-profit curve. Given that Q ft > QRmax , it must be that θ Rmax ≡
θ(QRmax + Rmax ) > θ(Q ft + L ft ) ≡ θ ft . QED
As stated earlier, this result was also found under the small country assumption
(Kaempfer, McClure, and Willett (1989), Larue, Fulton, and Veeman (1999), and
Larue, Veeman, and Fulton (1999). It means that domestic prices between θft and
θ Rmax cannot be observed under a quota. The implication is that comparisons of priceequivalent tariffs and quotas can be done under a limited range of domestic prices.
We now define a range of quota R ∈ (R1, R0] within which the monopolist adjusts
its output to deter smuggling. Therefore, smuggling matters even though it is not observed, as the level of output required to practice entry-deterrence depends on the
quota. The possibility of smuggling creates a kink in the residual demand of the monopolist, which determines the monopolist’s output and the domestic price for the
continuum of quotas R1 < R ≤ R0. The threat of smuggling is captured by the arbitrage
condition θ(Q + R) ≤ ω(R) + η(0). Differentiating this condition (when it binds) with
respect to Q and R yields
dQ / dR R ≤ R < R =
1

0

ω '− θ '
< −1 .
θ'

(17)

Tightening (loosening) the quota produces a more than proportional increase (decrease) in output when R ∈ (R1, R0]. Accordingly, the domestic price increases with
the quota in this domain. Once it is no longer profitable to deter smuggling, or when
R ≤ R1, the slope of the residual demand reflects the smugglers’ supply function, and
the monopolist’s behavioral rule becomes
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⎝ ω '+ η '− θ ' ⎠
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(18)

Differentiating this condition and the arbitrage condition, θ(Q + R + S) = ω(R + S) +
η(S), it can be shown that for R ∈ (0, R1],
dQ / dR =

θ'η'
< 0.
(η '+ ω ')c "− θ '(2η '+ 2ω '+ c ")

(19)

As expected, quota reductions induce increases in the domestic price since
η ' ( c "(ω '+ η ') − θ '(ω '+ η '+ c ") )
d (Q + R + S )
=
>0
(θ '− ω '− η ') ( −c "(ω '+ η ') + θ '(2ω '+ 2η '+ c ") )
dR

(20)

To facilitate our understanding of all the above comparative static results, we performed numerical simulations. The simulations shown in Figure 2 and in subsequent
figures are based on linear functional forms and specific parameters7 to support the
condition described in Lemma 2. Trade liberalization takes the form of quota
enlargements and tariff reductions. The specific tariffs defining different types of
equilibria are t0 = 5, t1 = 5.1931, and t2 = 5.1964. The critical ad valorem tariffs are τ0
= 0.745, τ1 = 0.793, and τ2 = 0.817, while for the quota regime we have R1 = 4.154,
R0 = 5.339, and Rmax = 10.356. The free trade price, domestic output, and import levels are respectively 9.91, 10.323, and 9.853. The dark thin line in Figure 2 portrays
domestic output, while the light gray and dark black lines are respectively the levels
of legal and illegal imports.
The top panel confirms that the strongest output response under a quota occurs
when R1 < R ≤ R0, that is, when the monopolist increases its output to deter smuggling. Smuggling occurs when quotas are restrictive or when tariffs are high. The
middle and bottom panels in Figure 2 depict the paths of domestic production and legal and illegal imports as the ad valorem and specific tariffs increase. The monopolist
is constrained by smuggling in the same manner, whether an ad valorem tariff τ ≥ τ2
or a specific tariff t ≥ t2 or a prohibitive quota R = 0 is used. Hence, all three instruments yield the same levels of production and illegal imports under these conditions.
However, the output of the monopolist under a nearly-prohibitive quota (i.e., 0 ≤ R ≤
R1) gets larger as the quota is tightened. The same can be said about an ad valorem
tariff near the threshold of redundancy (i.e., τ1 ≤ τ < τ2). In contrast, the monopolist’s
7

More specifically, domestic demand is parameterized as p = 20 – 0.5D, while foreign export supply
is expressed as ω = 4 + 0.6(L + S). The monopolist’s marginal cost is mc(Q) = 4 + 0.3Q.
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Figure 2. Domestic Production (black line), Legal Imports (light grey line), and Illegal Imports
(thick black line) Under Specific Tariffs t, Ad Valorem Tariffs τ , and Import Quotas R
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output is decreasing with the specific tariff when t1 ≤ t < t2. At lower levels of protection where smuggling does not matter, we observe decreases in domestic output and
increases in legal imports as trade barriers are relaxed.
Price Equivalent Tariffs and Quotas

A

S ARGUED AT THE OUTSET, THE CHOICE OF THE DOMESTIC PRICE

to anchor
the tariffs-quota comparisons is motivated by the fact that domestic price targets
often play a key role in agri-food policies. One can presume that many lobbyists express their demand in terms of a domestic price target. Besides wanting high domestic
prices, lobbyists have shown an interest in the way a domestic price target is met.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Canadian dairy producers lobbied hard to secure exceptions to the tariffication of non-tariff barriers in the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations. In spite of their effort, import quotas were replaced
with tariff-rate quotas with an over-quota tariff rate of 283 percent. Canada uses its
estimate of “cross-border shopping”/smuggling to fill its minimum access obligations
for fluid milk.8 The recent WTO dairy dispute involving Canada, the United States,
and New Zealand was motivated in part by Canada’s decision to legalize a practice
that would be costly to eradicate. Of course, it is impossible to determine the extent to
which the quota is filled. Canada also recently revised its regulation regarding the
import of pizza sold in parts because it was feared that it was a way to import cheese
without paying duties.
Instead of focusing on welfare-maximizing instruments as in Larue and Gervais
(2002), we compare policy instruments at various domestic prices and asked which
instrument generates the highest level of welfare for each feasible domestic price. The
welfare function of the government weighs equally consumer surplus, the profit of the
domestic firm, and the policy revenue (i.e., quota rent and tariff revenue). Once simplified, the welfare function can be expressed as
Q+ L+S

W=

∫

θ( x)dx − c(Q) − ω( L + S )( L + S ) − η( S ) S .

(21)

0

The above expression reflects the importance of “sourcing” in supplying the domestic
market (i.e., the motivation behind the optimal tariff argument). Trade policies can be
8

More specifically: “In Part I of Canada’s Schedule to GATT 1994, Canada established a tariff-rate
quota for fluid milk (HS 0401.10.10 and 0401.20.10) of 64,500 tonnes. In-quota imports are subject,
initially, to a maximum duty of 17.5 per cent (a rate to be decreased to 7.5 per cent in 2001). Fluid
milk imports outside of the 64,500 tonnes tariff-rate quota bear an initial rate of duty equal to 283.8 per
cent, declining to 241.3 per cent in 2001. In its Schedule, Canada specified under ‘Other terms and
conditions’ that ‘[t]his quantity [64,500 tonnes] represents the estimated annual cross-border purchases
imported by Canadian consumers’ ” (WTO 1999, p. 33).
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used to correct for the inability of competitive private importers to exploit the slope
of the foreign export supply curve. However, trade policies have also an incidence on
a second market failure due to the incentive of the domestic firm to under-produce.
Given that comparisons are anchored by the domestic price, the quantity consumed
D = Q + L + S must be the same for all instruments. The comparisons then boil down
to finding which instrument has the lowest aggregate cost, C(Q) + ω(L + S)(L + S) +
η(S), given the consumption constraint D = Q + L + S . Viewed this way, smuggling
has an obvious negative effect.
When both tariffs approach zero, equations (7) and (8) become similar. Accordingly, both tariffs are equivalent when the domestic price is equal to the world price:
θ(Qft + Lft) = ω(Lft). Under a quota equal to the free trade level of imports, the residual
demand is more inelastic than under a zero tariff, and the monopolist elects to produce less, which results in a higher price. Beyond some maximum quota Rmax, the
monopolist no longer finds it profitable to decrease its output, and the quota regime is
then abandoned in favor of free trade, as indicated by Lemma 2. The fact that the
minimum domestic price under binding import quota exceeds the free trade price implies that trade liberalization through quota enlargements will eventually induce
jumps in domestic output and price as imports moves from the maximum quota Rmax
to the level of imports under free trade Lft. At lower quota levels, the possibility of
smuggling has an effect on the upper limits of the domestic price.
PROPOSITION 1: If under the quota regime θ(R0) > θ(0), then the quota regime supports higher domestic prices than the specific and ad valorem tariffs.
PROOF.: The highest domestic price under the specific tariff is achieved at t ≥ t2. In
fact, it is easy to verify that

d (Q + S ) / dt t ≤t <t =
1

2

ω '+ η '
<0,
η'θ'

which implies that the domestic price is rising with the tariff in this domain. Actually,
the domestic price is rising with the tariff in other domains, except for t ≥ t2, at which
point increases in the tariff have no impact. This is illustrated by the bottom panel of
Figure 2. We have established that the domestic price is also rising when the quota is
reduced in the (0, R1] and (R0, Rmax] intervals. This gives rise to two local maxima.
Due to the threat of smuggling, the maximum price under a quota can occur at R = R0,
as shown in Figure 3. The maximum price under the specific tariff occurs at
ω ( S (t ) ) + t

t ≥ t2

,
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which is identical to the domestic price under a prohibitive quota. Therefore, the
maximum domestic price under the quota regime can exceed the maximum domestic
price under the specific tariff. Under the ad valorem tariff regime, the domestic price
at τ ≥ τ2 is not a maximum when the condition stated in Lemma 2 holds. Accordingly,
if τω′ > η′ when τ ∈ [τ1, τ2), the domestic price is declining with the tariff (see middle panel in Figure 3). Considering that the domestic price is rising with the tariff in
the [0,τ0), [τ0,τ1) intervals, a maximum is achieved at τ = τ1. Because there are legal
imports, the rule followed by the monopolist given by equation (11) embodies a more
elastic residual demand than (16), the rule followed by the monopolist when the highest domestic price is observed under a quota regime. Therefore, the maximum domestic price under the quota exceeds the maximum domestic price under the ad
valorem tariff, which in turn exceeds the maximum domestic price under the specific
tariff. QED
The above proposition and Lemma 2 have established that the range of domestic
prices supporting price-equivalent comparisons between policy instruments is truncated at the bottom and at the top. This provides another argument as to why protectionist lobbyists often prefer quotas over tariffs.9 The truncation at the top is possible
only because of smuggling. Without smuggling, all three instruments would generate
the same maximum domestic price. Naturally, the maximum domestic price set by the
domestic firm would be higher without competition from smugglers.
Before discussing the comparisons of price-equivalent tariffs and quotas, two
points must be emphasized from the plots displayed in Figure 3. First, consider the
top plot that illustrates the relationship between the size of the quota and the domestic
price. In the {R1, R0} domain, the threat of smuggling forces the monopolist to reduce
the domestic price sharply. Even though smuggling does not occur in this domain, it
has a positive impact. Once smuggling begins, at more restrictive quota sizes, the
domestic price rises again, but at a relatively slow rate given the rather elastic residual demand faced by the monopolist when R ∈ (0, R1]. The aggressive response by
the monopolist is aimed at smugglers. This is not the case under a specific tariff. The
domestic price falls as the tariff increases from τ1 to τ2. In this instance, the monopolist’s aggressive response is designed to keep legal imports from entering the domestic market. With the ad valorem tariff, the competitive effect of smuggling occurs
only when legal imports are eliminated. The second point is that any tariff rate in excess of τ2 or t2 provides redundant protection as the domestic price does not respond
to tariff increases beyond that point. Such cases are sometimes observed in practice.
The post-1995 tariff rates applied on Canadian dairy products in excess of the minimum access commitments are well over 200 percent, yet Larue, Veeman, and Fulton
9

Lloyd and Falvey (1986) provide several arguments to rationalize the preference for quotas by
protection-seeking interest groups.
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(1999) report evidence that dairy products were cheaper in Canada than in the United
States!10
The welfare analysis of price-equivalent tariffs and quotas without smuggling is
quite complex due to the possibility of several ranking reversals over the range of
admissible domestic prices (Larue, Gervais, and Pouliot 2004). The sensitivity of the
ranking to the positioning of the marginal cost curve illustrated in Figure 1 carries to
the large country case. Nevertheless, a general result emerges when the marginal cost
of production is lower than the marginal cost of imports under free trade. Sourcing
efficiency entails that the marginal costs of domestic production and imports be
equalized. This in turn implies the existence of specific production-import ratios at
various domestic prices. Free trade is inefficient because too many imports are allowed in. The converse is true at R = 0. Because the residual demand is more elastic
under a specific tariff at low domestic prices, the production-import ratios of specific
tariffs are closer to the efficient ratios at low domestic prices than those of the other
instruments. The same thing can be said about ad valorem tariffs and quotas at intermediate and high domestic prices respectively. The range of prices over which quotas
dominate when smuggling is ruled out can be very small if the domestic firm is “relatively efficient” (Larue, Gervais, and Pouliot 2004). With smuggling, there are still
imports when the domestic price achieves its maximum under the specific tariff regime. Furthermore, the range of feasible domestic prices has a lower upper limit. Because quota dominance occurs over a small range of high domestic prices when
smuggling is ruled out, one might wonder whether quota dominance remains feasible
and if so whether it must be at prices at which smuggling is high. The following
proposition answers these questions.
PROPOSITION 2: Unlike comparisons anchored by the volume of legal imports, specific tariffs cannot dominate welfare-wise price-equivalent ad valorem tariffs and
quotas over the whole range of admissible domestic prices. Quotas tend to dominate
at higher domestic prices, ad valorem tariffs at intermediate domestic prices, and
specific tariffs at lower domestic prices, as when smuggling is not feasible. When
quotas dominate, the price-equivalent tariffs need not be high enough to trigger
smuggling. The existence of a smuggling technology reduces the lower bound of the
range of domestic prices over which quotas dominate.
PROOF: Allowing for smuggling, Larue and Lapan (2002) have shown that the specific tariff dominates the other two instruments when the level of legal imports an10

Strangely enough, the Canadian government argued during its recent WTO dispute that the minimum access commitment for fluid milk is entirely filled by Canadian consumers who bring back milk
after a visit in the U.S. The lower Canadian prices and the smuggling from the U.S. can be reconciled
by noting that price differentials are sensitive to exchange rate variations. Thus, smuggling might take
place even though average Canadian prices are lower than average U.S. prices in a given year.
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chors the comparisons. This result suggests that the specific tariff will be the dominant instrument for at least a subset of domestic prices, regardless of the assumptions
about the marginal cost of domestic production. When the domestic firm is “fairly
efficient”11 and smuggling is not considered, Larue, Gervais, and Pouliot (2004) show
that production-import ratios for specific tariffs are closer to the ones that optimize
sourcing than production-import ratios for the other instruments at low domestic
prices. This result remains pertinent when smuggling is possible because smuggling
requires a minimum domestic-world price differential to be profitable.12 Thus, the
specific tariff should remain the dominant instrument at low domestic prices. As the
domestic price increases, the production-import combinations from ad valorem tariffs
and quotas become more efficient than the ones associated with specific tariffs when
smuggling is ruled out. This effect does not vanish when smuggling is allowed. Priceequivalence entails D ≡ Q t + Lt + S t = Q R + R + S R = Q τ + Lτ + S τ . Defining D as a
given level of demand, then φ(i ) ≡ c( D − Li − S i ) + ω( Li + S i ) *( Li + S i ) + η( S i ) , is the
sourcing cost of instrument i when the domestic price is θ( D) . Smuggling being
costly and because it begins at a lower domestic price under the specific tariff regime
than under the ad valorem tariff regime, there are intermediate domestic prices at
which specific tariffs are dominated by price-equivalent ad valorem tariffs. Quotas
can dominate high ad valorem tariffs for the same reason. There are quotas in the {0,
R1} domain that generate the same domestic prices as quotas in the {R1, R0} domain.
The quotas in the latter domain are superior because they do not involve smuggling.
Likewise, there are ad valorem tariffs in the {τ1, τ2} domain that generate the same
price as tariffs in {τ0, τ1} or {0, τ0} domains, within which there are legal imports.
Hence, tariffs in the {τ1, τ2} domain are dominated by price-equivalent quotas in the
{R1, R0} domain. If smuggling costs are high, quotas in the {R1, R0} domain can
dominate price-equivalent tariffs in the {τ0, τ1} domain. Larue and Lapan (2002) have
demonstrated that L(τ0) < R0 and that R1 < > L(τ0). Recall that for quotas R ∈ [R1, R0),
the domestic firm responds to quota reductions by lowering the domestic price to deter smuggling. This competitive response implies that equilibria around R1 have much
higher production-import ratios than quotas in the {R0, Rmax} domain. Therefore, the
threat of smuggling may be sufficient to improve the production-import ratios under

11

This means that under free trade, the marginal cost of imports is higher than the marginal cost of
domestic production.
12
Recall our assumption regarding the smuggling technology :
η( 0)

ω( 0)

>

η′
.
ω′

This implies that smugglers need a fairly high mark up over the world price to enter the domestic market. Once in the market, smugglers dramatically curtail the ability of the monopolist to charge high
prices because smuggling costs are not rising rapidly.
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the quota regime to allow quotas to dominate price-equivalent ad valorem tariffs in
the {0, τ0} domain. QED
Figure 4 illustrates the above proposition. It confirms that welfare is not maximized at low domestic prices due to the large country and monopolized production
assumptions (see Larue and Gervais 2002). The dominance of tariffs at low prices is
due to higher volumes of imports under the quotas and the relatively high marginal
cost of these imports. Absent smuggling, the lower bound of the range of domestic
prices over which quotas dominate would be 12.6. Such a price cannot be achieved
when smuggling is accounted for as shown in Figure 4! Still, the quota dominates for
some domestic prices. Smuggling does not occur, but the threat of smuggling influences the behavior of the firm. Another consequence of the introduction of smuggling
is the shrinkage of the range of prices over which the ad valorem tariff dominates.
Proposition 2 is interesting for several reasons. It shows that quotas could dominate price-equivalent ad valorem tariffs that are too low to trigger smuggling. The
implications for trade liberalization are evident. Highly protected imperfectly competitive sectors are better off with quotas (or tariff-rate quotas) than with tariffs if liberalization is to proceed at a slow pace. As trade liberalization progresses, quotas
should be abandoned in favor of specific tariffs as the range over which ad valorem
tariffs can dominate can be quite small when smuggling is taken into account.
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Revenue-Equivalent Tariffs and Quotas

R

for developing countries that need
to coordinate trade and domestic taxation reforms (e.g., Keen and Lighart 2002
and Moutos 2001). Though common in developed countries, smuggling is believed to
be more pervasive in developing economies which cannot afford to invest as much in
border enforcement and other smuggling deterrence activities.
Revenue can be generated with quotas R ∈ (0,Rmax], a range which is less restrictive than that of tariffs: t ∈ [0,t1) and τ ∈ [0,τ1). The impact of a quota increase on
government revenue is
EVENUE MOTIVES ARE OFTEN IMPORTANT

⎛ dθ dω ⎞
d ( θ(Q R + R + S R ) − ω( R + S R ) ) R / dR = θ(⋅) − ω(⋅) + R ⎜
−
⎟,
⎝ dR dR ⎠

(

)

where
⎛ dQ R dS R ⎞
⎛ dS R
d θ / dR = θ ' ⎜ 1 +
+
dw
dR
=
ω
⋅
and
/
'(
)
⎟
⎜1 +
dR
dR ⎠
dR
⎝
⎝

⎞
⎟.
⎠

One should keep in mind that smuggling may or may not be observed and hence that
some derivatives and arguments could be zero. The revenue effect of an increase in
the specific tariff is
d (tLt ) / dt = Lt + t

dLt
,
dt

while
d ( τ ω( Lτ + S τ ) Lτ ) / d τ = ω(⋅) Lτ + τ ( ω(⋅) + ω′(⋅) Lτ )

dLτ
dS τ
+ τω′(⋅) Lτ
dτ
dτ

captures the impact of an increase in the tariff rate on revenues.
LEMMA 3: The revenue-maximizing specific and ad valorem tariffs may involve
smuggling, unlike the revenue-maximizing quota.
PROOF: Absent smuggling, the revenue functions are concave with respect to the tariffs. Smuggling tends to depress revenue, but if η(0) and η′ are small, then smuggling
would occur at domestic prices close to the free trade price, and equilibria at the maxi-
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mum revenue tariffs would support smuggling. If η(0) and η′ are large, then the revenue-maximizing tariffs will be in the (0,t0] and (0,τ0] intervals. For the quota, the revenue function is concave in R in the {R0,Rmax} range and lim (dReν/dR) < > 0. ReveR → R0
nue is increasing in R in the {R1,R0} range because, from (17), dθ/dR=ω′, and hence
dReν/dR = θ(Q + R) – ω(R) > 0. At lower quota levels R ∈ [0, R1], smuggling occurs
and government revenue is increasing in R. Consequently, if lim ( d Re v / dR ) R > R0 <0,
R → R0
then the revenue-maximizing quota is R0. Otherwise, if lim ( d Re v / dR ) R > R0 > 0 , then
R → R0
the revenue-maximizing quota is less than R0. QED

Figure 5 confirms that the effect of smuggling on policy revenue can be particularly damaging, as shown by the rapid drop between t0 and t1 and between τ0 and τ1.
For the quota, policy revenue decreases at quota levels well above the critical quota
R1 at which point smuggling actually starts. This is because between R0 and R1, the
monopolist reacts to quota reductions by increasing domestic output/lowering
domestic price.
PROPOSITION 3: The quota regime can support higher revenues than the ad valorem
and specific tariff regimes.
PROOF: Lemma 3 established that the revenue-maximizing tariffs are in the {0, t1}
and {0, τ1} domains while their quota counterpart is in the {R0, Rmax} domain. If the
tariffs cannot generate more revenue than the quota when smuggling is not allowed
(negligible), then the quota will generate more revenue than the tariffs in the general
case with smuggling. Therefore, let us assume that there is no smuggling for the time
being. Government revenue can be expressed in terms of (legal) imports: Re v ( L) ≡
( θ ( Q( L) + L ) − ω( L) ) L . It is easy to verify that

⎛
>
⎛ ∂Q ⎞ ⎞
+ 1 ⎟ L ⎟ − (ω + ω ' L ) 0 .
d Re v( R) / dL = ⎜ θ + θ ' ⎜
<
⎝ ∂L ⎠ ⎠
⎝
The last component, the marginal cost of imports, is the same across instruments for a
given level of imports. The first component, which can be referred to as the gross
marginal revenue from imports, differs across policy instruments. For the quota, it is
easy to show that
∂Q
θ'
=
< 0,
∂R −2θ '+ c "
while for the specific tariff we have from (9) and (10) that
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Figure 5. Policy Revenue Under Import Quotas, Ad Valorem Tariffs, and Specific Tariffs
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∂Q
θ '(ω '− θ ')
=
<0.
∂L θ '(θ '− c ") + ω '(−2θ '+ c ")
Comparing these last two expressions, it follows that consumption (price) increases
(decreases) faster with imports under the tariff than under the quota. At the level of
imports that maximizes revenue under the specific tariff, L(treν), the domestic price
(level of imports) will be higher (lower) under the quota than under the specific tariff.
Therefore, the quota can generate higher revenue than the specific tariff. Because the
residual demand under the ad valorem quota is more (less) elastic than under the
quota (specific tariff), the maximum revenue generated by an ad valorem tariff is
lower (higher) than under the quota (specific tariff). QED
The above proposition is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. In Figure 6, the bold
dashed line shows that the same revenue can be achieved with two different quotas.
Naturally, revenue is zero when the quota is prohibitive. Hence, the points on the
upper segment associated with higher levels of welfare are generated by quotas
R ∈ [0, R1]. For R ∈ [R1, R0), the domestic price increases with legal imports and
revenue (welfare) increases (decreases). The bottom segment is associated with large
quotas and hence with high marginal import costs. The thin dashed line represents
different revenue-welfare combinations generated by ad valorem tariffs. The
continuous black line illustrates the revenue-welfare possibilities under the specific
tariff. Clearly, the best revenue-equivalent quotas are rather restrictive being in the
{0, R0} range, with a maximum welfare level reached at R = R1 < R0. Note that there is
smuggling in the {0, R1} portion of that range. At R = 0, t = t2, and τ = τ2, the revenue
generated by the three instruments is zero and they generate the same level of
welfare. Low tariffs generate higher welfare than higher revenue-equivalent tariffs.
Under free trade, both tariff regimes produce the same level of welfare, as depicted
by the highest intercept of the tariff lines in Figure 6.
PROPOSITION 4: In the range of revenues that can be achieved by all three instruments, the specific tariff dominates throughout. The ranking of the ad valorem tariff
and the quota is ambiguous.
PROOF: The dominant revenue-equivalent instrument is the one that has the highest
sum of consumer surplus and monopolist’s profit. This implies that at a given revenue
level rev ≡ (θ − ω) L , the criterion is
W =∫

Q+ L+S

0

θ( z )dz − θ(Q + L + S ) L − c(Q) .

Clearly, a low domestic price is desirable and, because θ – c′ > 0, the instrument with
the highest proportion of domestic output has an edge. Thus, specific tariffs achieve
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Figure 6. Welfare-Government Revenue Relationships Under Import Quotas (bold
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higher welfare than revenue-equivalent ad valorem tariffs and quotas at least at low
revenues (i.e., equilibria close to free trade for the tariffs and nearly prohibitive quotas).
The behavioral rule for the restrictive quotas is given by (18). It is equivalent to the
rule of the ad valorem tariff, equation (7), when τ = η′ / ω′ ≡ τˆ . At τ > τˆ ,

⎛ ω '(1 + τ) ⎞
θ + θ 'Q ⎜
⎟
⎝ ω '(1 + τ) − θ ' ⎠
is a steeper/more inelastic marginal revenue schedule than
⎛ ω '+ η ' ⎞
θ + θ 'Q ⎜
⎟,
⎝ ω '+ η '− θ ' ⎠
and this is why the domestic output-import combinations of ad valorem tariffs are not
as good at achieving high welfare levels as the revenue-equivalent quotas. As quotas
get bigger, smuggling decreases, and this is why the quota line in Figure 6 gets close
to the specific tariff line at high levels of welfare. When smuggling finally stops, at
R = R1, the monopolist’s behavioral rule under the quota changes in a dramatic
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fashion as quota increases induce increases in the domestic price and in revenue [see
equation (20)]. The high domestic prices are responsible for the abrupt decrease in welfare and the increase in revenue. These high levels of revenue are outside the range of
admissible revenues because they cannot be achieved under the specific tariff. QED
The policy ranking described in the above proposition is similar to that when the
volume of legal imports is used to anchor the tariffs-quota comparisons. This is so because legal imports and government revenues are closely related. Naturally, smuggling reduces the maximum revenue attainable under each policy. The welfare tradeoff to obtain the highest revenues under the quota regime in Figure 6 suggests that
spending on border enforcement may be detrimental.
Conclusion

T

on tariffs-quota
comparisons by considering the two types of tariffs, by allowing for smuggling,
by relaxing the small country assumption, and by using two variables to anchor the
comparisons, namely the domestic price and the revenue derived from the policies.
We find that low prices feasible under tariffs are not feasible under the quota, and that
high prices under the quota are not feasible under the tariffs. Maximum prices under
the tariff regimes always involve smuggling, while this need not be the case under the
quota. The maximum level of government revenues under the quota regime cannot be
achieved under the specific and ad valorem tariffs regimes. This outcome, of interest
mostly for less developed countries, is quite intuitive given that imports are forced in
under a quota and hence cannot be displaced by smugglers or domestic producers.
Kaempfer, McClure, and Willett (1989) have shown that quotas are dominated by
price-equivalent tariffs when the marginal cost of domestic production increases rapidly. In their model, the marginal cost of imports is constant. Owing to the large
country assumption and smuggling, this is not the case in our model. Still, welfare
comparisons of price-equivalent instruments remain about sourcing efficiency or the
adequate mix of production and imports. We show that even when the marginal cost
of legal imports is high, the quota can be dominant because of the monopolist’s response to the threat of smuggling. This suggests that sectors dominated by one or few
highly protected firms (private or public) might as well be protected by quantitative
barriers, like quotas or TRQs, rather than by tariffs. The highly protected Canadian
dairy industry whose supply management policy is designed to generate a “fair” price
to domestic producers is a case in point. As liberalization advances and domestic
prices fall, there is a point at which switching to a tariff regime is welfare-enhancing.
Specific tariffs are better than their ad valorem counterparts at low domestic prices.
Our results for revenue-equivalent instruments also show a ranking reversal between
HIS PAPER HAS EXTENDED THE CURRENT LITERATURE
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quotas and ad valorem tariffs, the latter being dominant for lower levels of government revenues.
Our results were derived under a very specific market structure, but replacing the
domestic monopolist by a small number of firms with Cournot conjectures still competing against a smuggling fringe would not matter much. Allowing for legal and/or
illegal imports to be controlled by one or two domestic traders would likely alter our
results. Because our results are conditioned by non-competitive responses to competitive pressures from legal and illegal sources, the non-equivalence outcomes derived above cannot be supported by a perfectly competitive market structure.
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